A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UTOPIA?
YOCHAI BENKLER

John Perry Barlow’s two essays capture a yearning to escape the
oppressive clutches of the two most important institutional forms in
modernity: the state and market society. A Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace is explicitly against the modern state. One
might say, “All right, but apart from the sanitation, the medicine,
education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh water system, and
public health, what have the Romans ever done for us?”1 The
Declaration reflected not only a libertarian utopia that assumed that if
only the state were to back off markets will take care of it all, but also a
left-anchored critique of the state as a critical site of protecting the power
and privilege of elites, insistence that individual self-actualization
demanded a state contained within narrow boundaries, and a deep
skepticism of all forms of authority, as Fred Turner showed in From
Counterculture to Cyberculture.2 Selling Wine Without Bottles is not
against markets or payment as such, but rather a resistance to the
totalizing vision of commodity exchange as all there is. In this, for me a
telling passage was:
[M]ost of what a middle class American purchases has little to do
with survival. We buy beauty, prestige, experience, education, and
all the obscure pleasures of owning. Many of these things can not
only be expressed in non-material terms, they can be acquired by
non-material means.
And then there are the inexplicable pleasures of information
itself, the joys of learning, knowing, and teaching. The strange good
feeling of information coming into and out of oneself. Playing with
ideas is a recreation which people must be willing to pay a lot for,
given the market for books and elective seminars. We’d likely
spend even more money for such pleasures if there weren’t so many
opportunities to pay for ideas with other ideas.
This explains much of the collective “volunteer” work which
fills the archives, newsgroups, and databases of the Internet. Its
denizens are not working for “nothing,” as is widely believed.
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Rather they are getting paid in something besides money. It is an
economy which consists almost entirely of information.3

Here was the nub of it. An ambition to live in spaces where the
commodity form was not everything. Where we could produce with and
for each other in relations of social exchange. The problem was not so
much markets as markets. It was the totalizing sense that markets are all
there is. Nothing captured this so clearly at the time than the battles over
music copyright, where the Recording Industry Association of America’s
(RIAA) vision of a celestial jukebox meant that music was a relationship
that should be fully mediated by money, down to the briefest moments of
pleasure or cultural reference. The position that Barlow presented here,
widely shared by many of us who worked to theorize and practically
construct the public domain, was a vision that music was a social
relationship and that markets had to be cabined alongside a robust
commons-based cultural production.
I spent much of the last twenty-five years focused primarily on
the latter of the two problems—the extent of the market and how we can
escape its totalizing reach. Only occasionally, and quite late in my own
work, did I turn to how we think about how we counter the oppressive
potential of the state without losing the benefits of its ability to deliver
public goods, contain market power, and redistribute wealth.
As I was preparing for the oddly introspective exercise of writing
my contribution here, I dug up an August 1995 draft of the job talk with
which I tried to persuade law schools to hire me. I opened with this:
Recognizing this historical moment presents us with a rare instance
at which we can make choices about the architecture of the new
technological base upon which our society and economy will be
built. Choices we make now will affect investment and use patterns,
which in turn will further affect the paths along which technology
itself will develop, and will affect how we conceive of information
and knowledge, and how we produce and consume that information
and knowledge. The network architecture and the patterns of use of
electronic communications that will develop from these choices will
have significant effects on our cultural, social, and economic
structure.

And then closed with:
Because the attributes of digital communications technology have
the potential to effect profound changes in the way we interact with
3
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one another, the stakes of how we regulate the networks through
which we will interact are very high. We could move ourselves
towards a society in which the production and consumption of
information and knowledge is decentralized and diversified,
emphasizing those attributes of digital technology that make
possible nonhierarchical, open communications available on a
more-or-less equal basis to all end users. We could also move our
society towards a centralized economy, in which a few large
information conglomerates have such fine-tuned information about
our preferences, powers, and vulnerabilities, that they can exert a
tremendous amount of control over our every choice. We will likely
move towards something that is neither Cybertopia nor Orwell’s
dystopia. But where along the spectrum from phobia to utopia our
society will actually end up will likely be affected by accumulated
choices we make today and tomorrow about who controls the
various components and aspects of the communications
infrastructure upon which our information society will be built. That
is where legislators, judges, and lawyers come in, for in every legal
decision, regulatory action, or law that effects an institutional
determination about who controls which resources that are pertinent
to the development of the electronic communications network, a
piece of our future is being determined.

Plus ça change.
In the 1990s, the particular institutional battle over power to
control the information economy and society were battles over the scope
of commons. I thought that the most important choices would be about
property and commons—in particular how building robust commons
could provide a steady resource base on which decentralized, selfgoverning communities and individuals could construct a robust system
of information, communications, knowledge, and cultural production that
was not dependent on market relations and could provide a measure of
freedom from powerful market actors, as well as from the state.
The primary failure of that vision was that except in important
isolated settings, where commons-based practices took root early and
were able to outcompete the state and the market, expansion of the
domain of nonmarket production has stalled.
The fundamental battle that I think Barlow insisted we join, and
that I too focused on, was the right battle for its time. It continues to be
the case that battles over the shape of property rights and technological
affordances will shape bargaining power within markets, and will shape
the existence and relative prevalence or importance of non-market forms
of production and social exchange. It’s still the case that in principle, as
we project twenty-five years forward, we might be in a world in which a
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core set of basic materials is pumped into our homes as electricity and
water are, and feed distributed fabricators (3D printers) become as
ubiquitous as laundry machines or microwaves. Such a system would
allow us to share designs as free and open source software (FOSS), user
innovation, or fan fiction are shared today, and to fabricate much of the
stuff we need in non-commodified, household production for our own
use and to share and exchange with others. No one has captured the
potential for such a non-commodified society like Cory Doctorow in
Walkaway. It’s still the case that the pattern of control over energy
generation could shift toward a distributed system, as solar panels and
wind turbines get connected over a neutral, public grid. It’s still the case
that services that depend on platforms could be structured as
cooperatives. Whether any of these developments will emerge will
depend in large measure on what institutional choices we make about the
technology and about how it is used in actual institutional settings and
firms. It will depend on whether this time (unlike in the 1990s), we will
succeed in seeing a population-level cultural change from people
perceiving themselves as consumers to people seeing themselves as
producers. And it will depend on whether we can integrate that shift into
our day to day practice as a revised view of the state and the market,
rather than as a displacement.
And there’s the rub. Because the kind of optimism that typified
Barlow’s writing, as well as at least some of my own, is much harder to
sustain now that we’ve seen how the successes of the first generation of
battles over the commons have turned out.
Facebook runs over TCP/IP and WiFi. The fact that the
underlying carrier technology and the Internet Protocol are open access
commons turned out not to have been enough to preserve people’s
freedom from the power of a small number of corporations. Both on the
consumer end, like Roku, and on the cloud services side, Linux is
everywhere. The Internet of Things could not run on anything other than
FOSS and spectrum commons. And yet, these devices are all centrally
controlled, and many function as the sensors for pervasive surveillance
systems. Just as industrial manufacturers cheerfully emitted pollutants
and effluents into the commons of the air and water to externalize some
of their costs, so too are Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple finding
ways of constructing new bottlenecks above and below the open layers,
creating new toll booths and points of observation,4 and using the “free”
nature of the open parts of the infrastructure as low cost input from
4
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which to then mine our “biopolitical public domain,” as Julie Cohen puts
it.5
What the past quarter century has taught us is that there are five
basic failure modes of commons-based strategies to construct more
attractive forms of social relations.
1. Companies and countries can usually sustain focused
strategic efforts for longer and more actively than
distributed networks of users. They can and do use these
advantages strategically to re-centralize control over
consumers and voters using mechanisms that are layered
over or circumvent the still-open parts of the ecosystem.
This is not true in all cases; Wikipedia has enough
activated users that they are able to overcome concerted
efforts to distort information; major FOSS development
projects of core pieces of infrastructure beat out proprietary
solutions.
But, as Wikipedia approaches its 20th
anniversary, we have to recognize that these major
examples of successful distributed commons-based social
production continue to be our prime examples. Time and
again over the past twenty years we have seen companies
spending money to harness relatively passive consumers—
whether it is in carrier-operated WiFi networks that
completely overshadowed the emergence of community
wireless networks, or whether it is in the App economy that
Apple introduced, based on the App Store model, that
increasingly has displaced for most people the openstandards based personal computer running an openstandards based html browser. And in the past five years
we have seen countries find ways of using the open nature
of communications to engage in propaganda and
manipulation, as well as to track dissidents and opponents
by tapping into the surveillance capabilities that companies
developed to continuously gather information about their
users for commercial sale.
2. Distributed social relations can themselves develop internal
hierarchies and inequities (the Iron Law of Oligarchy), as
current debates over Wikipedia and FOSS gender
participation ratios and governance make clear.
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3. Distributed open communications have provided enormous
play for genuinely hateful and harmful behavior, such that
we find ourselves seeking some power to control the worst
abuses—the power of the platforms we want to hold
democratically accountable, or the power of countries to
regulate those platforms for us. As early as Gamergate,
when networked gamers mobilized to harass and intimidate
women: game developers and media critics, in the name of
geek masculinity and free speech, and more prominently
since the various elections of 2016, we have come to
appreciate the extent to which fully distributed networks
can underwrite abusive behavior.
4. More fundamentally, as long as we live in a society where
people have to make money to eat and keep a roof over
their heads, markets produce stuff we really like and want.
For all the broad complaints about Amazon, it has
produced enormous consumer welfare. More directly, for
all the romanticization of fan videos and remix, the
emergence of subscription streaming services like Netflix
and Amazon Prime has been a boon to professional video
creators and underwritten a golden age of professional
video entertainment and narrative, both fiction and nonfiction.
5. States are still necessary to counter market power, provide
public goods on a sustained and large-scale basis by using
coercive taxing and spending powers, redistribute wealth,
and provide basic social and economic security for the
majority of the population.
Markets and states have proved remarkably resilient and
adaptive. Even where technological standards and institutions made it
possible for commons-based, distributed action to take root, both market
actors and states have found ways to impose their goals on most of the
population. This occurred primarily when the population engaging with
technology shifted from the more active and technically capable early
adopters to encompass a broader range of users, most of whom couldn’t,
or didn’t care to, use the freedoms that early adopters had put in place for
themselves. In part, this “domestication” of user creativity was done as a
sustained, intentional campaign, like the RIAA and MPAA’s litigation
and legislation campaign against remix culture in favor of the celestial
jukebox. In part, it may simply reflect the diversity of motivation among
human beings and the prevalence of the culture of passive consumption
when it is available. Perhaps there simply are more sheep than cats.

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

84

Beyond the simple fact that market and state actors re-emerged
as central sources of power, states in particular seem to present a much
more likely source of accountable power and counteracting force to
market-based power than was the prevailing sense among both left- and
right-libertarians in the 1990s. A resurgent progressive movement is
fighting hard to change the basic narrative on how important it is to
harness the state, accountably and democratically, to play its core roles.
So this, to me, is the great challenge facing those of us who still
want to think of technological change in terms of its effects on social
relations. We need a clearer and more fully articulated political economy
of technology. We need a better understanding of what the state and the
market are for, in the context of a genuine three-way interaction between
state, market, and commons-based production specifically or social,
nonmarket production more generally. And we need to internalize the
limits of anarchism, whether of the right or left spin. I see present
debates over blockchain, cryptocurrencies, and re-decentralizing the net,
and I see in them a rededication to the ideals that Barlow expressed so
poetically. The words are still there, but the music seems out of sync
with the beat of the times.

